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Abstract:
Historians of science and technology have generally ignored the role of power 
sources in the development of consumer electronics. In this they have followed the 
predilections of historical actors. Research, development, and manufacturing of 
batteries has historically occurred at a social and intellectual distance from the research, 
development, and manufacturing of the devices they power. Nevertheless, power source 
technoscience should properly be understood as an allied yet estranged field of 
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electronics. The separation between the fields has had important consequences for the 
design and manufacturing of mobile consumer electronics. This paper explores these 
dynamics in the co-construction of notebook batteries and computers. In so doing, it 
challenges assumptions of historians and industrial engineers and planners about the 
nature of computer systems in particular and the development of technological systems. 
The co-construction of notebook computers and batteries, and the occasional catastrophic
failure of their compatibility, challenges systems thinking more generally.
<A HEAD>Introduction
What have exploding batteries to do with personal computing, industrial innovation, 
and the philosophy of the history of technology? At first glance, perhaps not much. 
Technologists and the scholars of science, technology, and society who study their 
activities have long considered mobile power sources less interesting than the 
applications they serve. In marked contrast to consumer electronics, battery 
technoscience languished for most of the twentieth century until the late 1980s and early 
1990s. At that time, a powerful lithium-based rechargeable battery emerged as a key 
enabler of mobile telephony and computing. Because such power sources are bundled 
into their applications and are not generally available for retail sale, they command little 
attention except when they require recharging or replacing. In mid-2006, however, a 
wave of battery fires in notebook computers triggered the largest consumer electronics 
recalls in history. Sony batteries in a variety of different notebooks were especially prone 
to trouble, and so the Japanese firm received the lionÕs share of the blame, widely 
ascribed at the time to poor manufacturing quality control.{1}
These events cast into relief the ways both practitioners of science and engineering 
and scholars in the social studies of science and technology have gone about making 
sense of the world. If historians have generally ignored the role of power sources in 
consumer electronics and mobile computing hardware, they could be said to simply be 
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reflecting the priorities of historical actors. Properly understood as an allied but estranged
field of electronics, power source technoscience (comprising electrochemistry and solid 
state ionics) has been considered Òa solution in search of a problemÓ for much of its 
history.{2}  For a host of reasons, research and development of batteries has occurred at a
great social and intellectual distance from research and development of consumer 
devices, especially mobile computers.
This estrangement between batteries and the devices they power bears directly on the
notebook battery crisis and, more broadly, on ways historians and sociologists 
comprehend contemporary industrial-technological development. The ideas of Thomas P. 
Hughes have tended to dominate such discussions, and the Hughesian systems axioms 
(builders, heterogeneous components, and momentum/frontal progress, inhibited by the 
reverse salient) are familiar staples of the STS conceptual canon.{3}  Hughes derived his 
metaphor of networked service infrastructure from the case of the electrical grid in its 
early phases of construction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
scholars often assume that it applies to the social relations of innovation more 
generally.{4}
However, the Hughesian model does not exactly apply to some sophisticated 
consumer commodity technologies, including laptop computers and the batteries within 
them. Together, these do not form a single physical systemÑnot exactly. Unlike grid 
infrastructure, moreover, the pace of innovation in commodity electronics has been 
extremely rapid. And this sectorÕs dynamism dramatically accelerated at a time when the 
classic centralized industrial corporation of the sort Hughes was concerned with was 
undergoing a profound restructuring. The notebook computer battery crisis emerged at a 
time when electronics engineers were struggling to understand the implications of 
microprocessor scaling (miniaturization) on the operation of mobile computing systems, 
especially power demand. This was a period when the trend to outsource and offshore 
industrial production was well advanced. In the 2000s, discussions of the effects of the 
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decentralization of the US semiconductor industry tended to focus on job loss, but 
globalization also had profound consequences on the ability of computer engineers to 
solve physical problems issuing from miniaturization.{5}  I argue that offshoring and 
outsourcing in fact widened the existing intellectual gulf between electronics and battery 
technoscience and compromised the systems integration of notebook computer 
technology. Decentralizing industrial production thus set the stage for the battery fire 
crisis.
We may hence conceive the technosocial agglomeration of the notebook computer in 
this period as a dynamic system of systemsÑan inter-networkÑone whose physical and 
social components were imperfectly nested. That is, the physical requirements of mobile 
computing entailed the functional and hence disciplinary convergence of electronics and 
battery technoscience at a time when the social relations of innovation were increasingly 
geographically distributed and alienated. Certain assumptions informed (and were 
engendered by) this agglomeration: that decentralized research, development, and 
manufacturing facilitated efficient industrial commodification. I refer to these 
assumptions as postindustrial systems thinking. The notebook battery crisis illustrates the 
challenges this way of thinking posed to notebook manufacturing at the turn of the 
millennium and compels a fresh look at the history of computing. 
The emergence of Òplatform studiesÓ over the last seven years has done much to 
correct the longstanding bias for hardware that scholars believe had obscured the role of 
software, programmers, and users in earlier historical accounts.{6}  In the platform 
perspective, computers are multilayered amalgams of hardware and software; 
components produced by different suppliers are amenable to Òtranslation,Ó an underlying 
commensurability between otherwise incompatible systems.{7}  However, as with the 
Hughesian model, the platform axiom was derived from a specific setting: the classic era 
of home computers and video game consoles from the late 1970s to the earlyÐ
mid-1990s.{8}  Indeed, historians of computing have yet to substantively engage with the
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mobile device era.{9}  And so in the transhistorical perspective of todayÕs platform 
studies, the industrial production of personal computers appears straightforward. 
Distributed manufacturing of standardized parts is seen as a key factor in the 
commodification of the PC, enabling computer companies (Dell being the oft-cited 
archetype) to cut costs and massively, and unproblematically, boost productivity.{10}  
The case of the notebook battery fires challenges these assumptions. It suggests that 
the longstanding social and intellectual distance between power source and consumer 
electronics technoscience, aggravated by the gradual decentralization of corporate 
research, development, and manufacturing from the early 1980s (and often dated to the 
breakup of AT&T/Bell Labs in 1984), in fact posed considerable engineering and 
managerial challenges for computer companies as they sought to transition from desktops
to notebooks powered by novel lithium ion batteries from the early 1990s.
The notebook battery crisis calls particular attention to the actorsÕ categories of 
microprocessor clock speed and microprocessor scaling, widely believed to be the most 
important metrics, respectively, of computer performance and of progress in information 
technology more generally. Such views have been reinforced by the popularization of 
MooreÕs Law, the observation that the trend in miniaturization and integration of 
transistors correlated with declining manufacturing costs. By the turn of the millennium, 
MooreÕs Law had become a dominant metonym of innovation in the information 
technology sector, persisting even in the face of widespread acknowledgement of the 
impending physical barriers to scaling.{11}  The notebook battery crisis instead revealed 
that mobile computers were much more than simply a smaller package for smaller 
microprocessors. In the notebook era, accordingly, assumptions and expectations of 
performance and compatibility constructed in the desktop era did not always hold.
<A HEAD>Scaling and the Power Paradox
Belief in the microprocessor as the essence of personal computing has long guided 
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the thinking of practitioners, pundits, and policymakers, as well as popular and scholarly 
chroniclers of science and technology. It underpinned the creation of the SEMATECH 
consortium, the public-private enterprise of manufacturing research and development 
initiated in 1987 by the federal government (through the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency) at the behest of the semiconductor industry. It informed Intel branding 
from the early 1990s, the Pavlovian ring-tone of the ÒIntel InsideÓ campaign representing 
a noteworthy application of behavioral psychology in the digital age.
And the microprocessor-as-computer equation crucially informed the ways actors 
defined computer performance. The chief metrics have long been computations per 
second and, much more importantly in the era of personal computing, cost of 
computations per second, the latter tied inextricably to MooreÕs Law.{12}  Engineers 
tended to correlate this economic trend, and the exponential increase in processing power 
it fostered (as measured by instructions per cycle and clock speed), with other qualities of
performance, notably computations per unit of energy (performance per watt).{13}
At the systems level, however, power density did not scale. Packing more transistors 
together and increasing chip frequency generated heat, boosting voltage and power 
consumption, a phenomenon that the semiconductor industry seems to have been aware 
of as early as the mid-1990s.{14}  Scaling lowered supply and threshold voltages, but 
small transistors leaked small amounts of current exponentially as the threshold voltage 
diminished, meaning that it and the supply voltage had to be increased to control the 
leakage. In 1999, the director of IntelÕs Circuit Research Laboratory predicted that power 
density would become a serious problem in the near future.{15}  That moment arrived 
the following year, opined one IBM researcher at a National Research Council-sponsored
symposium in September 2001. Economists and computer technologists, he held, had 
failed to anticipate the rate of increase of power cost.{16}
The power problem worsened as computer designers added non-computational 
features.{17}  One contemporary critic held that semiconductor makers (notably Intel) 
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used claims of improved performance per watt as a way to mask increasing demands for 
power at the systems level. What energy savings as were made in central processing units
tended to be spent on graphics processing units.{18}
Where mobile computing was concerned, designers faced conflicting, indeed, 
irreconcilable imperatives. The quality of mobility dictated power as the chief design 
constraint, but the demand for increased functionality compelled designers to use 
increasingly powerful processors. Technologists attempted to resolve the resulting 
thermal problems with cooling devices, voltage scaled to real-time power demand, and 
above all, parallel systems employing multiple processors of only moderate speed but 
high efficiency.{19}  For some observers, such innovations begot mobile computing all 
on their own.{20}  
However, increasing demands for power also stimulated interest in power source 
technoscience. Indeed, even before power density became recognized as a serious reverse
salient of personal computing, the lithium cobalt oxide battery was an enabler of 
mobility. On its introduction in the early 1990s, this power source yielded around 90 watt
hours per kilogramÑtriple the energy density of the nickel-cadmium battery, which was 
then the most powerful rechargeable for consumer electronics applications. Over the next 
quarter century, designers more than doubled the capacity of lithium rechargeables to 210
watt hours per kilogram.{21}  Nevertheless, such progress paled against the exponential 
pace of transistor scaling. And it came with materials trade-offs that had important 
implications for applications, dynamics that were not well understood thanks to the 
intellectual and institutional gulf separating power source and personal computer 
innovation.
<A HEAD>Engaging an Orphan Technoscience
Necessity is not necessarily the mother of invention, as David Nye reminds us.{22}  
In no realm of technoscience is this observation more apt than in electrochemical power 
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sources. The commercial lithium cobalt oxide battery was not an original discrete 
invention, nor did the impetus for it originate in the electronics or computing sectors. In 
the words of Sony researcher Yoshio Nishi, the technology was a Ònovel combinationÓ of 
parts independently developed by a number of groups working for different ends over 
many years, a well-recognized and richly documented general phenomenon in social 
studies of science and technology.{23}
The halting and distributed nature of the research, development, and production of 
advanced power sources could be considered a legacy of what Schallenberg characterized
as the inertia that gripped the field of electrochemistry in the wake of the disappearance 
of electric vehicles from US public roads and of large-scale use of batteries in electric 
utility systems by the 1920s. In subsequent years, electrical engineers were not stimulated
to think in terms of electrochemical solutions to problems.{24}  To be sure, corporate 
research (by Bell Labs, General Electric, Esso/Exxon Research and Engineering, Ford 
Research Laboratories, Honeywell, Union Carbide, and others) made important 
contributions to advanced power source technoscience after the Second World War.{25}  
And the emergence of the conjoined energy and environmental crises in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century compelled civilian industry to experiment with electric traction 
systems.{26}
Generally, however, such research had a low priority on most corporate agendas. For 
its part, the automobile sector wrestled with uncertain economics of large rechargeable 
batteries. Because power sources have a much shorter lifespan than electric motors, they 
represent an unprecedented hidden replacement cost, one that automakers were not sure 
consumers would be willing to pay. For much of the postwar era, most manufacturers of 
commercial batteries contented themselves with a handful of proven, prosaic, and 
profitable electrochemical couples (nickel-iron, carbon-zinc, lead-acid, and nickel-
cadmium). One exception was the medical sector, where there was a demand for small, 
powerful, and very long-lived batteries for wearable and implant devices.{27}  Generally,
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however, only US state institutions were willing to fund and procure advanced power 
sources, mainly for specialized military roles.
Where the lithium cobalt oxide battery was concerned, a host of institutions 
contributed to its science and technology. The cathode was invented in 1980 by a team at 
Oxford University led by John B. Goodenough, an American physicist and pioneer of the 
field of solid-state ionics, the art and science of moving, inserting, and storing ions inside 
solids without fundamentally changing the structures of the host materials. As a fledgling 
researcher in Project Lincoln, the effort to develop the computer for the Semi-Automatic 
Ground System air defense network in the 1950s, Goodenough discovered that the 
presence of metal oxides in a ferrimagnetic spinel could induce structural changes that 
bred magnetic discontinuities, and, hence, the quality of switchability.{28}
Solid-state ionics could also be applied to energy storage. The field would stimulate a
major shift in the understanding of power source technology at a time when 
electrochemists believed that the important reactions occurred on electrode surfaces in 
relation to liquid electrolytes. After moving to Oxford University in 1976, some of 
GoodenoughÕs research developed in response to the Exxon CorporationÕs lithium 
titanium disulfide battery, a project that in turn had been motivated by the possibility that 
the energy crisis would force automakers to commercialize electric vehicles. Invented by 
M. Stanley Whittingham, lithium titanium disulfide successfully demonstrated the 
phenomenon of intercalation, the completely reversible insertion and extraction of ions 
into electrode host matrices, the basic operating principle of a lithium ion battery.{29}
But the technology could not be commercialized for automobile use because repeated
recharging induced a dangerous interaction between its metallic lithium anode and 
flammable organic electrolyte, a non-aqueous substance made necessary owing to 
lithiumÕs reactivity with water.{30}  Less interested in developing a practical successor to
this power source than investigating materials for a powerful cathode, Goodenough drew 
on his experience with metal oxides, establishing lithium cobalt oxide as a stable 
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insertion compound.{31}  However, he lacked a safe anode, and so battery manufacturers
were uninterested in his invention.{32}
In principle, carbon was preferable for the anode because it enabled relatively 
unproblematic reversible lithium intercalation. Over the years, research along these lines 
was performed at Sanyo (H. Ikeda, 1981), FranceÕs Centre Nationale de la Recherche 
(Rachid Yazami, 1982Ð83), and the Asahi Kasei Corporation (Akira Yoshino, 1985). 
From 1985, SonyÕs Energytec division worked to integrate these ideas in a device 
intended to replace the nickel-cadmium battery. In a project that owed a good deal to the 
contributions of Asahi Kasei and Yoshino, the division selected the carbon anode/lithium 
cobalt oxide combination as the best balance between cyclability, discharge capacity, and 
safety.{33}
Even so, these materials comprised a highly potent mix. The greatest challenge, held 
Nishi, was learning how to industrially produce and package them in commodity 
cells.{34}  One problem was how to scale production of cathode material. The existing 
process yielded fine lithium cobalt oxide particles with large surface area, a fire hazard in
the event of a short circuit or external damage to the cell, so Sony had to invent a process 
to coarsen the granules. Even so, lithium ion battery packs were susceptible to thermal 
runaway, which could be triggered by a wide variety of events including overcharge, 
overdischarge, and short circuits. They had to be equipped with numerous safety features 
including current interrupters and gas vent mechanisms. Perhaps most important was the 
separator, a polymer membrane that insulated the electrodes and inhibited dendrites 
(growths of unevenly deposited lithium) and short circuits while offering minimal 
resistance to ionic transport. Separator micropores were designed to expand and cut off 
the charge current in the event of a heat spike, the last line of defense against thermal 
runaway if failure was not sudden.{35}
This, at least, was the idea. Some battery researchers claimed that no safety device 
was very effective at stopping thermal runaway once initiated.{36}  In the case of the 
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separator, an absolutely essential safety material, some specialists associated this problem
with poor coordination between original equipment manufacturers and their suppliers. 
Battery makers did not then cooperate with makers of separators and devoted relatively 
little attention to membranes compared to electrodes and electrolytes. Generally, such 
materials were not tailored to specific battery applications but were instead developed for
other purposes by suppliers with narrow margins, limited means, and few incentives to 
conduct original research and development.{37}  The simplest and cheapest way of 
increasing the storage capacity of lithium ion cells was by thinning out separators, a tactic
with serious risks.{38}
<A HEAD>Dell and Sony Do Notebooks
The relationship between Sony and Dell in the development of notebook computer 
technology, and the application of notebook battery technology, illustrates the challenges 
postindustrial systems thinking posed to the management of innovation and production. It
highlights the ways collaboration across corporate cultures in the era of offshoring and 
outsourcing conditioned and complicated engineering practice. A pioneering titan of 
audiovisual consumer electronics, Sony had built its brand on new product development, 
an approach that compelled the company to develop most of its own parts and informed a
substantially vertically integrated corporate structure. By the 1980s and 1990s, Sony had 
developed a parallel policy of competing in every market niche and producing a wide 
range of products, which placed a heavy demand on internal resources.{39}  In the realm 
of personal computers, this strategy yielded a notable lack of success. Sony produced PCs
and workstations throughout the 1980s, mainly for the Japanese domestic market, but had
essentially abandoned the field around the time it was preparing commercial lithium ion 
power sources for mobile telephony in the late 1980s and early 1990s.{40}
In contrast, Dell specialized in commodifying the PC. Michael Dell attributed his 
companyÕs spectacular growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s to what he referred to as 
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Òvirtual integration,Ó a management philosophy emphasizing marketing and logistics over
engineering and that took the trend towards vertical disintegration to its logical 
conclusion. DellÕs organizational premises of mail-order direct sales and lean 
manufacturing had been predicated on the physical characteristics of the desktop 
computer, which, with its discrete retail components (monitor, case, and keyboard), 
allowed suppliers to rebadge and directly mail them (notably monitors) to customers. 
Such methods allowed the Austin-based computer upstart to maintain low parts 
inventories and a skeleton R&D cadre.{41}
But it proved far more difficult to integrate outsourced parts in notebook technology, 
the most profitable segment of the personal computer market. DellÕs abortive first crack 
at mobile computing revealed the limits of virtual integration as an engineering principle. 
DellÕs 320/25Sli was considered uncompetitively slow thanks to its Intel 386 
microprocessor at a time when the 486 was becoming the norm, but it also had a 
reputation for unreliability. Some units overheated and smoked thanks to, according to 
one theory, a faulty interconnect between the capacitor and the AC power supply. There 
were no reported fires because Dell then used non-flammable nickel metal hydride 
(NiMH) batteries, which employed water-based electrolyte. Nevertheless, some 17,000 
laptops were recalled.{42}
In early 1993, Dell suspended production and restructured its notebook program. 
However, the new plan preserved the core precepts of the desktop-based marketing and 
supply chain model. Dell hired away hardware expertise from Hewlett Packard (HP) and 
Apple, including designers who had worked on Powerbook, led by John Medica. Irvine-
based AST Research did the manufacturing.{43}  What was novel about the forthcoming 
Latitude was that it was to be equipped with a new power source. Dell planners made 
battery life the third most important parameter after price and microprocessor speed. 
After a protracted debate, they selected lithium ion over NiMH, calculating that it 
represented the difference between a ÒgoodÓ product and a ÒsuperbÓ one.{44}
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The decision reflected the preference of Michael Dell, who had been impressed by a 
pitch for lithium power that Sony representatives had made in January 1993.{45}  DellÕs 
efforts to position itself as a manufacturer of notebooks thus aligned it with SonyÕs efforts
to supply notebook components and thereby retain a hand in the personal computing 
market. Still, Dell engineers rated the approach as risky. They were aware that lithium ion
batteries had only just been introduced in relatively low-power consumer applications 
and had not yet been tried in portable computers.{46}
When Sony decided to fully reenter the personal computing market in the mid-1990s,
it conceived its new Vaio as a premium product optimized for the audiovisual capabilities
in which the company had made its name. In keeping with its vertically integrated 
structure, Sony co-located the design and engineering of the power source and electronics
of the Vaio notebook.{47}  Where DellÕs revamped notebook program was concerned, all
that had changed was that planners had added a highly energetic power source to virtually
integrated manufacturing.
<A HEAD>The Recalls
By the early 2000s, the divergence in the design and manufacturing of notebook 
computers and power sources had become deeply entrenched organizationally and 
epistemically. To a degree, this gap reflected distinct emerging national/cultural 
approaches to industrial innovation. Although US industry and government had helped 
stimulate important advances in novel power source technologies, the US consumer 
electronics sector was not organized to exploit them. Unlike its Japanese counterpart, 
observed one US industry insider, American industrial power source culture lacked strong
connections both with the state and manufacturers of battery applications.{48}
So, too, were American designers of mobile electronics and computers alienated from
the exigencies of power source technology. Manufacturers tended to undersize battery 
cavities for the expected performance or otherwise mismatched them with power source 
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form factors.{49}  And as notebook designers introduced faster processors that generated 
more heat and required more power, lithium ion cell designers increased energy density 
by thinning separators to make room for more reactive material, creating thermal 
management problems and narrowed margins of safety.{50}
Economic pressures further eroded these margins, and here the picture of hermetic, 
non-communicative national innovation systems becomes complicated. Pioneered by 
Sony, the lithium ion battery sector quickly became a highly competitive, low-margin 
industry dominated by a few firms, based mainly in Japan. From around 2000 they began 
to move manufacturing to South Korea and China in operations that, as industry insiders 
observed, were initially characterized by extensive bugs and high cell scrap rates.{51}
With this shift came an increase in reported problems with mobile devices. Consumer
product recalls are a familiar aspect of life in late modern society, and the electronics 
sector is no exception. As we have seen, Dell had to withdraw some of its first laptops in 
the early 1990s, and it was not the only company to have to do so. In 1995, Apple pulled 
its PowerBook 5300 model following failures of lithium ion batteries that in some cases 
involved fires.{52}  Nevertheless, the US Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
issued only a handful of laptop battery recalls in the 1990s.
That changed dramatically in the 2000s, when there were no fewer than twenty-one 
such recalls, with an especially strong linkage between Sony and Dell. Nine recalls 
occurred before 2005, going virtually unnoticed in the press. Of these, Dell was involved 
in four, more than any other manufacturer. The first three (in October 2000, May 2001, 
and December 2005) were relatively small and based on a handful of reported events. The
first two involved Sanyo battery packs manufactured in Japan. Encompassing some 
27,000 packs for the Latitude and Inspiron models, the 2000 recall advised that the 
battery could short-circuit even when not in use.{53}  The 2001 recall involved 284,000 
units for Inspiron notebooks, by far the largest such event to date, and came with the 
warning that the batteries were susceptible to overcharge.{54}  Sandwiched between 
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these events was a recall of 55,000 Sony batteries for Compaq Armada notebooks in 
October 2000.{55}
Of the remaining four recalls in this period, two (in August 2004 and May 2005) 
involved Apple Powerbook G4 notebooks using LG Chem-brand packs built in Taiwan. A
total of ten incidents of overheating were traced to internal shorts.{56}  Of the remaining 
pre-2006 recalls, the most notable involved HP in October 2005. Based on sixteen reports
of overheating, it affected 135,000 packs worldwide, the largest recall to date, and 
involved batteries assembled in China and Taiwan by an unidentified manufacturer.{57}
Among other things, the 2006 recalls were notable for their unprecedented size in 
relation to the number of reported incidents. On August 15, on only six reports of 
overheating, Dell recalled 4.2 million Sony lithium ion battery packs manufactured in 
Japan and China for Latitude, Inspiron, Dell Precision, and XPS notebooks. Representing
15 to 18 percent of DellÕs laptop production for the period, it was the largest recall of 
consumer electronics to date.{58}
The scale of the recall on so few reported incidents foreshadowed a brewing 
controversy. It was no secret that Dell and Sony had long known that something was 
amiss. On the day of the recall, the New York Times cited a former Dell employee who 
claimed the PC maker had suppressed hundreds of incidents of catastrophic failures 
dating back to 2002.{59}  On August 18, InfoWorld quoted a Sony official who admitted 
that as early as October 2005, Dell and Sony had agreed that the failures traced to cell 
shorting were induced by microscopic metallic contaminants. Rather than issue a recall, 
Sony made unspecified production changes in February.{60}
But although in the wake of the August 15 recall Dell and Sony again concurred that 
quality control problems were persisting, they did not agree on the cause. Dell theorized 
that contamination occurred at the end of SonyÕs manufacturing process, when cell cans 
were capped and crimped, and was confident the manufacturer had fixed the 
problem.{61}  From SonyÕs perspective, the question was less clear. In describing its 
15
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
remedial work, all the company would publicly admit was that it had strengthened 
protective cell barriers and linings, a defensive move suggesting that it did not know 
where in its process the fault lay. A researcher at Sandia National Laboratory opined that 
contamination was occurring somewhere mid-stream, as sheets of anode, separator, and 
cathode material were wound into rolls before being deposited in cell cans.{62}
Interestingly, the CPSC did not endorse the contamination theory. Without denying 
its quality control woes, Sony also pointed to faulty notebook design. Noting that cell 
configuration, thermal management, and charging protocols varied across the industry, 
the company suggested that responsibility for battery packs lay with computer 
manufacturers. Ultimately, argued Sony, thermal runaway was being triggered by 
notebook systems issues unique to Dell. Other manufacturers agreed, insisting that their 
own pack designs were sound.{63}
Almost as soon as this theory was introduced, it began to unravel. On August 24, on 
nine reports of overheating, Apple recalled 1.1 million Sony powerpacks manufactured in
Japan, China, and Taiwan for iBook G4 and PowerBook G4 notebooks. The second 
largest recall in consumer electronics history, it affected around a third of the notebooks 
Apple had sold since October 2003.{64}  On September 28, Sony initiated a global 
replacement program for certain battery packs, reiterating that the potential of 
contaminants to cause short circuits depended on the systems configurations of particular 
notebooks.{65}  The same day, Lenovo/IBM recalled over 520,000 packs manufactured 
in Japan and China for ThinkPad notebooks after one ignited at the Los Angeles 
International Airport.{66}  Shortly thereafter, Sony planned its own broad recall of 
battery packs containing its cells, with one analyst suggesting that the company had been 
motivated by the ban airlines had placed on such packs and the increasing political 
pressure to restore confidence so that it could be lifted.{67}  Three weeks later, with PC 
makers now uniting to blame Sony for faulty parts, the company recalled 3.4 million 
packs manufactured in Japan, China, Taiwan, and Malaysia for Fujitsu, Gateway, 
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Toshiba, and, for the first time, Sony notebooks.{68}
By late October, Sony had withdrawn some 9.6 million battery packs. Its reputation 
and pocketbook considerably dented, the company continued to insist that computer 
makers bore some measure of responsibility.{69}  The record of recalls in this period 
suggests there was something to the claim, for only one involved Sony batteries in Sony 
computers, and it was a cautionary, not incident-based recall. Vaio laptops appeared to 
have been relatively trouble-free at the time. Years later, Goodenough seemed to confirm 
the Sony account. He suggested that the problem ultimately traced to improperly charge-
balanced packs, wherein some cells received more charge than others. When this 
occurred, lithium plated unevenly on the anode, forming dendrites that could induce a 
short circuit.{70}
As far as the popular media was concerned, the battery crisis peaked in late 2006. 
Nevertheless, relatively small battery recalls continued for years afterwards, involving a 
variety of cells in a variety of laptops, eventually even SonyÕs Vaio.{71}  
Notwithstanding HPÕs keenness to publicly express its understanding of the importance 
of battery pack management, lithium batteries in its notebooks gave the most trouble in 
this period. Between 2008 and 2011, the CPSC tallied some eighty-nine incidents and 
twenty-one injuries involving HP notebooks, the largest numbers to date on both counts, 
triggering three consecutive annual recalls. In 2012, the company paid a modest civil 
penalty for failing to report incidents in a timely manner, the only manufacturer so 
sanctioned to that time.{72}
<A HEAD>Epilogue
What does the notebook battery crisis reveal of the history of computing in particular,
of contemporary industrial innovation in general, and of the role of the historian in 
comprehending events? On the one hand, it qualifies and enriches the platform 
perspective while cautioning against transhistorical systems thinking about industrial 
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innovation. Vertical disintegration helped manufacturers rapidly commodify the desktop 
personal computer, but also seriously complicated the engineering and manufacturing of 
the mobile computer. Lessons of systems integration learned in the desktop context did 
not necessarily apply to mobile computing.
A few contemporary analyses did touch on this phenomenon. One paper produced for
a workshop organized by the National Academy of Engineering in 2006 linked the 
complex manufacturability of notebook computers to the battery failures and implied a 
connection with the disintegration of work practices.{73}  Other observers more 
explicitly made this connection. Reliability engineer Michael Pecht noted that notebook 
manufacturers favored batteries with high power and long run-time, and, thus, the most 
volatile chemistries. Guided by the principle of planned obsolescence, manufacturers 
assumed that consumers would throw away and replace old handheld devices long before
aging batteries became a problem. Accordingly, they devoted hardly any research to 
battery reliability and safety, with consequences aggravated by the rapid global dispersal 
of supply chains.{74}  
For their part, economists and business management analysts have been increasingly 
concerned with the problem of how to coordinate distributed supply lines.{75}  Science 
policymakers have long associated innovation with vertically integrated institutional 
structures and advocated for their creation in governmental contexts as a means of 
bolstering national economic growth.{76}
The story of the notebook battery crisis furthers understanding of the social relations 
of globalization by showing the influence of corporate decentralization on material 
practices of science and engineering in the consumer electronics and personal computing 
sectors. It illuminates behaviors and coping mechanisms of actors in negotiating the 
imperfectly nested realms of the postindustrial inter-network, notably improvisation and 
exploiting the user experience of faulty consumer goods.{77}  In the short term, the 
scapegoating of Sony likely mystified understanding of how batteries related to power 
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density and the packaging of notebook technology. Eventually, however, industryÕs ad 
hoc approach to the presumptive anomaly of power density did enrich the systems 
thinking of certain semiconductor manufacturers, to judge by their acceptance of the 
Òmegahertz mythÓ and of other metrics of computer performance besides central 
processing unit speed.{78}  
Over time, consumer product recalls became an additional crucial element of 
postindustrial corporate epistemology, a phenomenon scholars of business management 
have observed in other manufacturing environments, notably the automobile sector.{79}  
Recalls served to socialize the risks of offshored and outsourced development and 
manufacturing. As consumer product crises have burgeoned in recent years, the prospect 
of formalizing their study has appealed to business studies.{80}  Conceiving product 
recalls as a characteristic postindustrial way of knowing may also provide historians and 
sociologists of contemporary science and technology with a useful means of 
understanding the dynamics of imperfectly nested systems in the vertically disintegrated 
corporate milieu.
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{2}  Richard H. Schallenberg expressed this point in his pioneering study of battery 
technology; see Bottled Energy. 
{3}  Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power.
{4} Hughes, ÒThe Evolution of Large Technological Systems.Ó
{5}  See, for example, the twelve-year study conducted by Clair Brown and Greg 
Linden, ÒOffshoring in the Semiconductor IndustryÓ; and the Committee on the 
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{6}  See, for example, Nathan Ensmenger, ÒRethinking Computers,Ó The Computer 
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